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abstract. Q0 is an elegant version of Church’s type theory for-
mulated and extensively studied by Peter B. Andrews. Like other
traditional logics, Q0 does not admit undefined terms. The tradi-
tional approach to undefinedness in mathematical practice is to treat
undefined terms as legitimate, nondenoting terms that can be com-
ponents of meaningful statements. Qu0 is a modification of Andrews’
type theory Q0 that directly formalizes the traditional approach to
undefinedness. This paper presents Qu0 and proves that the proof sys-
tem of Qu0 is sound and complete with respect to its semantics which
is based on Henkin-style general models. The paper’s development of
Q
u
0 closely follows Andrews’ development of Q0 to clearly delineate
the differences between the two systems.
1 Introduction
In 1940 Alonzo Church introduced in [4] a version of simple type theory
with lambda-notation now known as Church’s type theory. Church’s stu-
dents Leon Henkin and Peter B. Andrews extensively studied and refined
Church’s type theory. Henkin proved that Church’s type theory is com-
plete with respect to a semantics based on general models [14] and showed
that Church’s type theory can be reformulated so that it is based on only
the primitive notions of function application, function abstraction, equality,
and (definite) description [15]. Andrews devised a simple and elegant proof
system for Henkin’s reformulation of Church’s type theory [1]. He also for-
mulated a version of Church’s type theory called Q0 that employs the ideas
developed by Church, Henkin, and himself. Q0 is meticulously described
and analyzed in [2] and is the logic of the tps Theorem Proving System [3].
1Originally published in: C. Benzmu¨ller, C. Brown, J. Siekmann, and R. Statman,
eds., Reasoning in Simple Type Theory: Festschrift in Honor of Peter B. Andrews on
his 70th Birthday, Studies in Logic, pp. 223–242, College Publications, 2008.
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Church’s type theory has had a profound impact on many areas of com-
puter science, especially programming languages, automated reasoning, for-
mal methods, type theory, and formalized mathematics. It is the fountain-
head of a long stream of typed lambda calculi that includes systems such as
System F [12], Martin-Lo¨f type theory [17], and the Calculus of Construc-
tions [5]. Several computer theorem proving systems are based on versions
of Church’s type theory including hol [13], imps [10, 11], Isabelle [19],
ProofPower [16], pvs [18], and tps.
One of the principal virtues of Church’s type theory is that it has great
expressivity, both theoretical and practical. However, like other traditional
logics, Church’s type theory assumes that terms are always defined. Despite
the fact that undefined terms are commonplace in mathematics (and com-
puter science), undefined terms cannot be directly expressed in Church’s
type theory—as they are in mathematical practice.
A term is undefined if it has no prescribed meaning or if it denotes a
value that does not exist.2 There are two main sources of undefinedness
in mathematics. The first source is terms that denote an application of a
function. A function f usually has both a domain of definition Df consisting
of the values at which it is defined and a domain of application D∗f consisting
of the values to which it may be applied. (The domain of definition of a
function is usually called simply the domain of the function.) These two
domains are not always the same, but obviously Df ⊆ D∗f . A function
application is a term f(a) that denotes the application of a function f to an
argument a ∈ D∗f . f(a) is undefined if a 6∈ Df . We will say that a function
is partial if Df 6= D∗f and total if Df = D
∗
f .
The second source of undefinedness is terms that are intended to uniquely
describe a value. A definite description is a term t of the form “the x that
has property P”. t is undefined if there is no unique x (i.e., none or more
than one) that has property P . Definite descriptions are quite common in
mathematics but often occur in a disguised form. For example, “the limit of
sin 1x as x approaches 0” is a definite description—which is undefined since
the limit does not exist.
There is a traditional approach to undefinedness that is widely practiced
in mathematics and even taught to some extent to students in secondary
school. This approach treats undefined terms as legitimate, nondenoting
terms that can be components of meaningful statements. The traditional
approach is based on three principles:
1. Atomic terms (i.e., variables and constants) are always defined—they
always denote something.
2Some of the text in this section concerning undefinedness is taken from [9].
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2. Compound terms may be undefined. A function application f(a) is
undefined if f is undefined, a is undefined, or a 6∈ Df . A definite
description “the x that has property P” is undefined if there is no x
that has property P or there is more than one x that has property P .
3. Formulas are always true or false, and hence, are always defined. To
ensure the definedness of formulas, a function application p(a) formed
by applying a predicate p to an argument a is false if p is undefined,
a is undefined, or a 6∈ Dp.
A logic that formalizes the traditional approach to undefinedness has two
advantages over a traditional logic that does not. First, the use of the tradi-
tional approach in informal mathematics can be directly formalized, yielding
a result that is close to mathematical practice. Second, statements involving
partial functions and undefined terms can be expressed very concisely. In
particular, assumptions about the definedness of terms and functions often
do not have to be made explicit. Concise informal mathematical statements
involving partial functions or undefinedness can usually only be expressed in
a traditional logic by verbose statements in which definedness assumptions
are explicit. For evidence and further discussion of these assertions, see [9].
We presented in [6] a version of Church’s type system named pf that
formalizes the traditional approach to undefinedness. pf is the basis for
lutins [7, 8], the logic of the imps theorem proving system [10, 11]. The
paper [6] includes a proof that pf is complete with respect to a Henkin-
style general models semantics. The proof, however, contains a mistake:
the tautology theorem does not hold in pf as claimed. This mistake can be
corrected by adding modus ponens and a technical axiom schema involving
equality to pf’s proof system. In [9] we introduced a version of Church’s
type system with undefinedness called sttwu which is simpler than pf. The
proof system of sttwu is claimed to be complete, but a proof of complete-
ness is not given in [9].
The purpose of this paper is to carefully show what changes have to be
made to Church’s type theory in order to formalize the traditional approach
to undefinedness. We do this by presenting a modification of Andrews’ type
theory Q0 called Qu0 . Our goal is to keep Q
u
0 as close to Q0 as possible,
changing as few of the definitions in [2] concerning Q0 as possible. We
present the syntax, semantics and proof system of Qu0 and prove that the
proof system is sound and complete with respect to its semantics. A series
of notes indicates precisely where and how Q0 and Qu0 diverge from each
other.
Our presentation of Qu0 differs from the presentation of pf in [6] in the
following ways:
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1. The notation and terminology for Qu0 is almost identical to the no-
tation and terminology for Q0 given in [2] unlike the notation and
terminology for pf.
2. The semantics of Qu0 is simpler than the semantics of pf.
3. The proof system of Qu0 is complete unlike the proof system of pf.
4. The proof of the completeness theorem for Qu0 is presented in greater
detail than the (erroneous) proof of the completeness theorem for pf.
The paper is organized as follows. The syntax of Qu0 is defined in sec-
tion 2. A Henkin-style general models semantics for Qu0 is presented in
section 3. Section 4 introduces several important defined logical constants
and notational abbreviations. Section 5 gives the proof system of Qu0 . Some
metatheorems of Qu0 and the soundness and completeness theorems for Q
u
0
are proved in sections 6 and 7, respectively. The paper ends with a conclu-
sion in section 8.
The great majority of the definitions for Qu0 are exactly the same as those
for Q0 given in [2]. We repeat only the most important and least obvious
definitions for Q0; for the others the reader is referred to [2].
2 Syntax of Qu0
The syntax of Qu0 is almost exactly the same as that of Q0. The only
difference is that just one iota constant is primitive in Q0, while infinitely
many iota constants are primitive in Qu0 .
A type symbol of Qu0 is defined inductively as follows:
1. ı is a type symbol.
2. o is a type symbol.
3. If α and β are type symbols, then (αβ) is a type symbol.
Let T denote the set of type symbols. α, β, γ, . . . are syntactic variables
ranging over type symbols. When there is no loss of meaning, matching
pairs of parentheses in type symbols may be omitted. We assume that type
combination associates to the left so that a type of the form ((αβ)γ) may
be written as αβγ.
The primitive symbols of Qu0 are the following:
1. Improper symbols : [, ], λ.
2. A denumerable set of variables of type α for each α ∈ T : fα, gα, hα,
xα, yα, zα, f
1
α, g
1
α, h
1
α, x
1
α, y
1
α, z
1
α, . . . .
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3. Logical constants : Q((oα)α) for each α ∈ T and ι(α(oα)) for each α ∈ T
with α 6= o.
4. An unspecified set of nonlogical constants of various types.
xα,yα, zα, fα,gα,hα, . . . are syntactic variables ranging over variables of
type α.
Note 1 (Iota Constants). Only ι
ı(oı) is a primitive logical constant inQ0;
each other ια(oα) is a nonprimitive logical constant in Q0 defined according
to an inductive scheme presented by Church in [4] (see [2, pp. 233–4]). We
will see in the next section that the iota constants have a different semantics
in Qu0 than in Q0. As a result, it is not possible to define the iota constants
in Qu0 as they are defined in Q0, and thus they must be primitive in Q
u
0 .
Notice that ιo(oo) is not a primitive logical constant of Q
u
0 . It has been left
out because it serves no useful purpose. It can be defined as a nonprimitive
logical constant as in [2, p. 233] if desired. 
We are now ready to define a wff of type α (wffα). Aα,Bα,Cα, . . . are
syntactic variables ranging over wffs of type α. A wffα is then defined
inductively as follows:
1. A variable or primitive constant of type α is a wffα.
2. [AαβBβ] is a wffα.
3. [λxβAα] is a wffαβ .
A wff of the form [AαβBβ] is called a function application and a wff of
the form [λxβAα] is called a function abstraction. When there is no loss
of meaning, matching pairs of square brackets in wffs may be omitted. We
assume that wff combination of the form [AαβBβ ] associates to the left so
that a wff [[CγβαAα]Bβ ] may be written as CγβαAαBβ .
3 Semantics of Qu0
The traditional approach to definedness is formalized in Qu0 by modifying
the semantics of Q0. Two principal changes are made to the Q0 semantics:
(1) The notion of a general model is redefined to include partial functions
as well as total functions. (2) The valuation function for wffs is made into a
partial function that assigns a value to a wff iff the wff is defined according
to the traditional approach.
A frame is a collection {Dα | α ∈ T } of nonempty domains such that:
1. Do = {T,F}.
6 William M. Farmer
2. For α, β ∈ T , Dαβ is some set of total functions from Dβ to Dα if
α = o and is some set of partial and total functions from Dβ to Dα if
α 6= o.3
Do is the domain of truth values, Dı is the domain of individuals, and for
α, β ∈ T , Dαβ is a function domain. For all α ∈ T , the identity relation on
Dα is the total function q ∈ Doαα such that, for all x, y ∈ Dα, q(x)(y) = T
iff x = y. For all α ∈ T with α 6= o, the unique member selector on Dα is
the partial function f ∈ Dα(oα) such that, for all s ∈ Doα, if the predicate
s represents a singleton {x} ⊆ Dα, then f(s) = x, and otherwise f(s) is
undefined.
Note 2 (Function Domains). In a Q0 frame a function domain Dαβ
contains only total functions, while in a Qu0 frame a function domain Doβ
contains only total functions but a function domainDαβ with α 6= o contains
partial functions as well as total functions. 
An interpretation 〈{Dα | α ∈ T },J 〉 of Qu0 consists of a frame and a
function J that maps each primitive constant of Qu0 of type α to an element
of Dα such that J (Qoαα) is the identity relation on Dα for each α ∈ T and
J (ια(oα)) is the unique member selector on Dα for each α ∈ T with α 6= o.
Note 3 (Definite Description Operators). The ια(oα) in Q0 are de-
scription operators : if Aoα denotes a singleton, then the value of ια(oα)Aoα
is the unique member of the singleton, and otherwise the value of ια(oα)Aoα
is unspecified. In contrast, the ια(oα) inQ
u
0 are definite description operators :
ifAoα denotes a singleton, then the value of ια(oα)Aoα is the unique member
of the singleton, and otherwise the value of ια(oα)Aoα is undefined. 
An assignment into a frame {Dα | α ∈ T } is a function ϕ whose domain
is the set of variables of Qu0 such that, for each variable xα, ϕ(xα) ∈ Dα.
Given an assignment ϕ, a variable xα, and d ∈ Dα, let (ϕ : xα/d) be the
assignment ψ such that ψ(xα) = d and ψ(yβ) = ϕ(yβ) for all variables
yβ 6= xα.
An interpretation M = 〈{Dα | α ∈ T },J 〉 is a general model for Qu0 if
there is a binary function VM such that, for each assignment ϕ and wff Cγ ,
either VMϕ (Cγ) ∈ Dγ or V
M
ϕ (Cγ) is undefined and the following conditions
are satisfied for all assignments ϕ and all wffs Cγ :
3The condition that a domain Doβ contains only total functions is needed to ensure
that the law of extensionality holds for predicates. This condition is weaker than the
condition used in the semantics for pf [6] and its extended versions pf∗ [7] and lutins[7,
8]. In these logics, a domain Dγ contains only total functions iff γ has the form oβ1 · · ·βn
where n ≥ 1. The weaker condition, which is due to Aaron Stump [20], yields a semantics
that is simpler.
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(a) Let Cγ be a variable of Qu0 . Then V
M
ϕ (Cγ) = ϕ(Cγ).
(b) Let Cγ be a primitive constant of Qu0 . Then V
M
ϕ (Cγ) = J (Cγ).
(c) Let Cγ be [AαβBβ ]. If V
M
ϕ (Aαβ) is defined, V
M
ϕ (Bβ) is defined, and
the function VMϕ (Aαβ) is defined at the argument V
M
ϕ (Bβ), then
VMϕ (Cγ) = V
M
ϕ (Aαβ)(V
M
ϕ (Bβ)),
the value of the function VMϕ (Aαβ) at the argument V
M
ϕ (Bβ). Oth-
erwise, VMϕ (Cγ) = F if α = o and V
M
ϕ (Cγ) is undefined if α 6= o.
(d) Let Cγ be [λxβBα]. Then V
M
ϕ (Cγ) is the (partial or total) func-
tion f ∈ Dαβ such that, for each d ∈ Dβ , f(d) = V
M
(ϕ:xβ/d)(Bα)
if VM(ϕ:xα/d)(Bα) is defined and f(d) is undefined if V
M
(ϕ:xβ/d)
(Bα) is
undefined.
Note 4 (Valuation Function). In Q0, if M is a general model, then
VM is total and the value of VM on a function abstraction is always a
total function. In Qu0 , if M is a general model, then V
M is partial and the
value of VM on a function abstraction can be either a partial or a total
function. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let M be a general model for Qu0. Then V
M is defined
on all variables, primitive constants, function abstractions, and function
applications of type o and is defined on only a proper subset of function
applications of type α 6= o.
Note 5 (Traditional Approach). Qu0 clearly satisfies the three principles
of the traditional approach to undefinedness. Like other traditional logics,
Q0 only satisfies the first principle. 
Let H be a set of wffso and M be a general model for Qu0 . Ao is valid in
M, writtenM |= Ao, if V
M
ϕ (Ao) = T for all assignments ϕ. M is a general
model for H if M |= Bo for all Bo ∈ H. Ao is valid (in the general sense)
in H, written H |= Ao, if M |= Ao for every general model M for H. Ao
is valid (in the general sense) in Qu0 , written |= Ao, if ∅ |= Ao.
Note 6 (Mutual Interpretability). Qu0 can be interpreted in Q0 by
viewing a function of type αβ in Qu0 as a function (predicate) of type oαβ
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in Q0. Q0 can be interpreted in Qu0 by viewing a function of type αβ in Q0
as a total function of type αβ in Qu0 . Thus Q0 and Q
u
0 are equivalent in the
sense of being mutually interpretable. 
4 Definitions and Abbreviations
As Andrews does in [2, p. 212], we will introduce several defined logical
constants and notational abbreviations. The former includes constants for
true and false, the propositional connectives, and a canonical undefined
wff. The latter includes notation for equality, the propositional connectives,
universal and existential quantification, defined and undefined wffs, quasi-
equality, and definite description.
[Aα = Bα] stands for [QoααAαBα].
To stands for [Qooo = Qooo].
Fo stands for [λxoTo] = [λxoxo].
[∀xαAo] stands for [λyαTo] = [λxαAo].
∧ooo stands for [λxoλyo[[λgooo[goooToTo]] = [λgooo[goooxoyo]]]].
[Ao ∧Bo] stands for [∧oooAoBo].
⊃ooo stands for [λxoλyo[xo = [xo ∧ yo]]].
[Ao ⊃ Bo] stands for [⊃oooAoBo].
∼oo stands for [QoooFo].
[∼Ao] stands for [∼ooAo].
∨ooo stands for [λxoλyo[∼[[∼xo] ∧ [∼yo]]]].
[Ao ∨Bo] stands for [∨oooAoBo].
[∃xαAo] stands for [∼[∀xα∼Ao]].
[∃1xαAo] stands for [∃yα[[λxαAo] = Qoααyα]]
where yα does not occur in Ao.
[Aα 6= Bα] stands for [∼[Aα = Bα]].
[Aα ↓] stands for [∃xα[xα = Aα]]
where xα does not occur in Aα.
[Aα ↑] stands for [∼[Aα ↓]]
[Aα ≃ Bα] stands for [Aα ↓ ∨Bα ↓] ⊃ [Aα = Bα].
[IxαAo] stands for [ια(oα)[λxαAo]].
⊥α stands for [Ixα[xα 6= xα]] where α 6= o.
[∃1xαAo] asserts that there is a unique xα that satisfies Ao.
[IxαAo] is called a definite description. It denotes the unique xα that sat-
isfies Ao. If there is no or more than one such xα, it is undefined. Following
Bertrand Russell and Church, Andrews denotes this definite description op-
erator as an inverted lower case iota ( ι). We represent this operator by an
(inverted) capital iota (I).
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[Aα ↓] says that Aα is defined, and similarly, [Aα ↑] says that Aα is
undefined. [Aα ≃ Bα] says that Aα and Bα are quasi-equal, i.e., that
Aα and Bα are either both defined and equal or both undefined. ⊥α is a
canonical undefined wff of type α.
Note 7 (Definedness Notation). In Q0, [Aα ↓] is always true, [Aα ↑] is
always false, [Aα ≃ Bα] is always equal to [Aα = Bα], and ⊥α denotes an
unspecified value. 
5 Proof System of Qu0
In this section we present the proof system of Qu0 which is derived from the
proof system of Q0. The issue of definedness makes the proof system of
Qu0 moderately more complicated than the proof system for Q0. While Q0
has only five axiom schemas and one rule of inference, Qu0 has the following
thirteen axiom schemas and two rules of inference:
A1 (Truth Values)
[gooTo ∧ gooFo] = ∀xo[gooxo].
A2 (Leibniz’ Law)
[xα = yα] ⊃ [hoαxα = hoαyα].
A3 (Extensionality)
[fαβ = gαβ] = ∀xβ [fαβxβ ≃ gαβxβ ].
A4 (Beta-Reduction)
Aα ↓ ⊃ [[λxαBβ ]Aα ≃ S
xα
Aα
Bβ ]
provided Aα is free for xα in Bβ .
4
A5 (Variables are Defined)
xα ↓.
4Sxα
Aα
Bβ is the result of substituting Aα for each free occurrence of xα in Bβ .
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A6 (Primitive Constants are Defined)
cα ↓ where cα is a primitive constant.5
A7 (Function Abstractions are Defined)
[λxαBβ ]↓.
A8 (Function Applications of Type o are Defined)
AoβBβ ↓.
A9 (Improper Function Application of Type o)
[Aoβ ↑ ∨Bβ ↑] ⊃ ∼[AoβBβ ].
A10 (Improper Function Application of Type α 6= o)
[Aαβ ↑ ∨Bβ ↑] ⊃ AαβBβ ↑ where α 6= o.
A11 (Equality and Quasi-Quality)
Aα ↓ ⊃ [Bα ↓ ⊃ [[Aα ≃ Bα] ≃ [Aα = Bα]]].
A12 (Proper Definite Description)
∃1xαAo ⊃ [[IxαAo]↓ ∧ S
xα
[IxαAo]
Ao] where α 6= o
and provided IxαAo is free for xα in Ao.
A13 (Improper Definite Description)
∼[∃1xαAo] ⊃ [IxαAo]↑ where α 6= o.
R1 (Quasi-Equality Substitution) From Aα ≃ Bα and Co infer
the result of replacing one occurrence of Aα in Co by an occurrence of
Bα, provided that the occurrence of Aα in Co is not (an occurrence
of a variable) immediately preceded by λ.
R2 (Modus Ponens) From Ao and Ao ⊃ Bo infer Bo.
5Notice that cα ↓ is false if cα is a defined constant ⊥α where α 6= o.
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Note 8 (Axiom Schemas). The axiom schemas A1, A2, A3, A4, and A12
of Qu0 correspond to the five axiom schemas of Q0. A1 and A2 are exactly
the same as the first and second axiom schemas of Q0. A3 and A4 are
modifications of the third and fourth axiom schemas of Q0. A3 is the axiom
of extensionality for partial and total functions, and A4 is beta-reduction
for functions that may be partial and arguments that may be undefined.
The seven axiom schemas A5–A11 of Qu0 deal with the definedness of
wffs. A5 and A6 address the first principle of the traditional approach to
undefinedness, A10 addresses the second principle, and A8 and A9 address
the third principle. A7 states that a function abstraction always denotes
some function, either partial or total. And A11 is a technical axiom schema
for identifying equality with quasi-equality when applied to defined wffs.
The last two axiom schemas of Qu0 state the properties of definite descrip-
tions. A12 states that proper definite descriptions are defined and denote
the unique value satisfying the description; it corresponds to the fifth axiom
schema of Q0. A13 states that improper definite descriptions are undefined.
The proof system of Q0 leaves improper definite descriptions unspecified. 
Note 9 (Rules of Inference). Qu0 ’s R1 rule of inference, Quasi-Equality
Substitution, corresponds to Q0’s single rule of inference, which is equality
substitution. These rules are exactly the same except that the Qu0 rule
requires only quasi-equality (≃) between the target wff and the substitution
wff, while the Q0 rule requires equality (=).
Qu0 ’s R2 rule of inference, Modus Ponens, is a primitive rule of inference,
but modus ponens is a derived rule of inference in Q0. Modus ponens must
be primitive in Qu0 since it is needed to discharge the definedness conditions
on instances of A4, the schema for beta-reduction, and A11. 
A proof of a wffo Ao in Qu0 is a finite sequence of wffso, ending with Ao,
such that each member in the sequence is an instance of an axiom schema
of Qu0 or is inferred from preceding members in the sequence by a rule of
inference of Qu0 . A theorem of Q
u
0 is a wffo for which there is a proof in Q
u
0 .
Let H be a set of wffso. A proof of Ao from H in Qu0 consists of two
finite sequences S1 and S2 of wffso such that S1 is a proof in Qu0 , Ao is the
last member of S2, and each member Do of S2 satisfies at least one of the
following conditions:
1. Do ∈ H.
2. Do is a member of S1 (and hence a theorem of Qu0).
3. Do is inferred from two preceding members Aα ≃ Bα and Co of S2 by
R1, provided that the occurrence of Aα in Co is not in a well-formed
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part λxβEγ of Co where xβ is free in a member of H and free in
Aα ≃ Bβ.
4. Do is inferred from two preceding members of S2 by R2.
We write H ⊢ Ao to mean there is a proof of Ao from H in Qu0 . ⊢ Ao is
written instead of ∅ ⊢ Ao. Clearly, Ao is a theorem of Qu0 iff ⊢ Ao.
The next two theorems follow immediately from the definition above.
THEOREM 2 (R1′). If H ⊢ Aα ≃ Bα and H ⊢ Co, then H ⊢ Do, where
Do is the result of replacing one occurrence of Aα in Co by an occurrence of
Bα, provided that the occurrence of Aα in Co is not immediately preceded
by λ or in a well-formed part λxβEγ of Co where xβ is free in a member of
H and free in Aα ≃ Bα.
THEOREM 3 (R2′). If H ⊢ Ao and H ⊢ Ao ⊃ Bo, then H ⊢ Bo.
6 Some Metatheorems
In this section we prove some metatheorems of Qu0 that are needed to prove
the soundness and completeness of the proof system of Qu0 .
PROPOSITION 4 (Wffs of type o are defined). ⊢ Ao ↓ for all wffs Ao.
Proof. Directly implied by axiom schemas A5, A6, and A8. 
THEOREM 5 (Beta-Reduction Rule). If H ⊢ Aα ↓ and H ⊢ Co, then
H ⊢ Do, where Do is the result of replacing one occurrence of [λxαBβ]Aα
in Co by an occurrence of S
xα
Aα
Bβ, provided Aα is free for xα in Bβ and the
occurrence of [λxαBβ ]Aα is not in a well-formed part λyγEδ of Co where
yγ is free in a member of H and free in [λxαBβ ]Aα.
Proof. Follows immediately from A4, R1′, and R2′. 
LEMMA 6. ⊢ Aα ≃ Aα.
Proof. Let xα be a variable that does not occur in Aα. Then xα ↓ is
an instance of A5, and xα ↓ ⊃ [[λxαAα]xα ≃ Aα] is an instance of A4.
By applying R2′ to these two wffs we obtain ⊢ [[λxαAα]xα ≃ Aα]. The
conclusion of the lemma then follows by the Beta-Reduction Rule. 
LEMMA 7. If H ⊢ Aα ↓ and H ⊢ Bα ↓, then H ⊢ Aα ≃ Bα iff H ⊢ Aα =
Bα.
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Proof.
(⇒): Follows immediately from A11, R1′, and R2′.
(⇐): H ⊢ [Aα ≃ Bα] ≃ [Aα = Bα] by the first two hypotheses, A11,
and R2′. ⊢ [Aα ≃ Bα] ≃ [Aα ≃ Bα] by Lemma 6. We obtain H ⊢
[Aα = Bα] ≃ [Aα ≃ Bα] by applying R1′ to these two statements. The
conclusion of the lemma then follows by applying R1′ to this last statement
and H ⊢ Aα = Bα. 
COROLLARY 8. If ⊢ Aα ↓, then ⊢ Aα = Aα.
Proof. By Lemmas 6 and 7. 
LEMMA 9. If ⊢ Aα ↓ and ⊢ Bβ ≃ Cβ, then ⊢ S
xα
Aα
[Bβ ≃ Cβ ], provided Aα
is free for xα in Bβ ≃ Cβ.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 6 and the Beta-Reduction Rule in a way that
is similar to the proof of theorem 5209 in [2]. 
COROLLARY 10. If ⊢ Aα ↓ and ⊢ Bo = Co, then ⊢ S
xα
Aα
[Bo = Co],
provided Aα is free for xα in Bo = Co.
Proof. By Proposition 4, Lemma 7, and Lemma 9. 
LEMMA 11. If ⊢ Bβ ↓, then ⊢ To = [Bβ = Bβ].
Proof. The proof of ⊢ To = [Bβ ≃ Bβ ] is similar to the proof of theorem
5210 in [2] with Corollaries 8 and 10 used in place of theorems 5200 and
5209, respectively. The lemma then follows from A11, R1, and R2. 
LEMMA 12. If ⊢ Ao = Bo and ⊢ Co = Do, then ⊢ [Ao = Bo]∧ [Co = Do].
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5213 in [2] with Lemma 11 used in
place of theorem 5210. 
The proofs of the next four theorems are similar to the proofs of theorems
5215, 5220, 5234, and 5240 except that:
1. Rule R1 and Lemma 7 are used in place of rule R.
2. Rule R1′ and Lemma 7 are used in place of rule R′.
3. The Beta-Reduction Rule is used in place of the β-Contraction rule.
4. Corollary 8 is used in place of theorem 5200.
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5. Axiom schema A4 and Lemma 7 are used in place of theorem 5207.
6. Corollary 10 is used in place of theorem 5209.
7. Lemma 11 is used in place of theorem 5210.
8. Lemma 12 is used in place of theorem 5213.
9. Rule R2′ is used in place of theorem 5224 (MP).
10. Axiom schemas A5–A8 are used to discharge definedness conditions.
THEOREM 13 (Universal Instantiation). If H ⊢ Aα ↓ and H ⊢ ∀xαBo,
then H ⊢ Sxα
Aα
Bo, provided Aα is free for xα in Bo.
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5215 (∀I) in [2]. See the comment
above. 
THEOREM 14 (Universal Generalization). If H ⊢ Ao, then H ⊢ ∀xαAo,
provided xα is not free in any wff in H.
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5220 (Gen) in [2]. See the comment
above. 
THEOREM 15 (Tautology Theorem). If H ⊢ A1o, . . . , H ⊢ A
n
o and [A
1
o ∧
· · · ∧ Ano ] ⊃ Bo is tautologous for n ≥ 1, then H ⊢ Bo. Also, if Bo is
tautologous, then H ⊢ Bo.
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5234 (Rule P) in [2]. See the
comment above. 
PROPOSITION 16. ⊢ [Aα = Bα] ⊃ [Aα ≃ Bα].
Proof. Follows from the definition of ≃ and the Tautology Theorem. 
THEOREM 17 (Deduction Theorem). If H ∪ {Ho} ⊢ Po, then H ⊢ Ho ⊃
Po.
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 5240 in [2]. See the comment above.

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7 Soundness and Completeness
In this section, let H be a set of wffso. H is consistent if there is no proof
of Fo from H in Qu0 .
THEOREM 18 (Soundness Theorem). If H ⊢ Ao, then H |= Ao.
Proof. A straightforward verification shows that (1) each instance of each
axiom schema of Qu0 is valid and (2) the rules of inference of Q
u
0 , R1 and R2,
preserve validity in every general model for Qu0 . This shows that if ⊢ Ao,
then |= Ao.
Suppose H ⊢ Ao and M is a model for H. Then there is a finite sub-
set {H1o, . . . ,H
n
o} of H such that {H
1
o, . . . ,H
n
o} ⊢ Ao. By the Deduction
Theorem, this implies ⊢ H1o ⊃ · · · ⊃ H
n
o ⊃ Ao. By the result just above,
M |= H1o ⊃ · · · ⊃ H
n
o ⊃ Ao. But M |= H
i
o for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n since M
is a model for H. Therefore M |= Ao, and so H |= Ao. 
THEOREM 19 (Consistency Theorem). If H has a general model, then H
is consistent.
Proof. Let M be a general model for H. Assume that H is inconsistent,
i.e., that H ⊢ Fo. Then, by the Soundness Theorem, H |= Fo and hence
M |= Fo. This means that V
M
ϕ (Fo) = T (for any assignment ϕ), which
contradicts the definition of a general model. 
A cwff [cwffα] is a closed wff [closed wffα]. A sentence is a cwffo. Let
H be a set of sentences. H is complete in Qu0 if, for every sentence Ao,
either H ⊢ Ao or H ⊢ ∼Ao. H is extensionally complete in Q
u
0 if, for every
sentence of the form Aαβ = Bαβ , there is a cwff Cβ such that:
1. H ⊢ Cβ ↓.
2. H ⊢ [Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [AαβCβ ≃ BαβCβ ]] ⊃ [Aαβ = Bαβ ].
Let L(Qu0) be the set of wffs of Q
u
0 .
LEMMA 20 (Extension Lemma). Let G be a consistent set of sentences of
Qu0 . Then there is an expansion Q
u
0 of Q
u
0 and a set H of sentences of Q
u
0
such that:
1. G ⊆ H.
2. H is consistent.
3. H is complete in Qu0.
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4. H is extensionally complete in Qu0.
5. card(L(Qu0)) = card(L(Q
u
0)).
Proof. The proof is very close to the proof of theorem 5500 in [2]. The
crucial difference is that, in case (c) of the definition of Gτ+1,
Gτ+1 = Gτ ∪ {∼[Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [Aαβcβ ≃ Bαβcβ]]}
where cβ is the first constant in Cβ that does not occur in Gτ orAαβ = Bαβ .
(Notice that ⊢ cβ ↓ by A6.)
To prove that Gτ+1 is consistent assuming Gτ is consistent when Gτ+1 is
obtained by case (c) , it is necessary to show that, if
Gτ ⊢ Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [Aαβcβ ≃ Bαβcβ],
then Gτ ⊢ Aαβ = Bαβ . Assume the hypothesis of this statement. Let P be
a proof of
Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [Aαβcβ ≃ Bαβcβ ]
from a finite subset S of Gτ , and let xβ be a variable that does not occur
in P or S. Since cβ does not occur in Gτ , Aαβ , or Bαβ , the result of
substituting xβ for each occurrence of cβ in P is a proof of
Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [Aαβxβ ≃ Bαβxβ ]
from S. Therefore,
S ⊢ Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [Aαβxβ ≃ Bαβxβ ].
This implies
S ⊢ Aαβ ↓, S ⊢ Bαβ ↓, S ⊢ ∀xβ [Aαβxβ ≃ Bαβxβ ]
by the Tautology Theorem and Universal Generalization since xβ does not
occur in S. It follows from these that Gτ ⊢ Aαβ = Bαβ by A3, Lemma 6,
Proposition 16, Universal Generalization, Universal Instantiation, R1′, and
R2′.
The rest of the proof is essentially the same as the proof of theorem 5500.

A general model 〈{Dα | α ∈ T },J 〉 for Qu0 is frugal if card(Dα) ≤
card(L(Qu0)) for all α ∈ T .
THEOREM 21 (Henkin’s Theorem for Qu0). Every consistent set of sen-
tences of Qu0 has a frugal general model.
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Proof. Let G be a consistent set of sentences of Qu0 , and let H and Q
u
0 be as
described in the Extension Lemma. We define simultaneously, by induction
on γ ∈ T , a frame {Dα | α ∈ T } and a partial function V whose domain is
the set of cwffs of Qu0 so that the following conditions hold for all γ ∈ T :
(1γ) Dγ = {V(Aγ) | Aγ is a cwffγ and H ⊢ Aγ ↓}.
(2γ) V(Aγ) is defined iff H ⊢ Aγ ↓ for all cwffs Aγ .
(3γ) V(Aγ) = V(Bγ) iff H ⊢ Aγ = Bγ for all cwffs Aγ and Bγ .
Let V(x) ≃ V(y) mean either V(x) and V(y) are both defined and equal or
V(x) and V(y) are both undefined.
For each cwffAo, ifH ⊢ Ao, let V(Ao) = T, and otherwise let V(Ao) = F.
Also, let Do = {T,F}. By the consistency and completeness of H, exactly
one of H ⊢ Ao and H ⊢ ∼Ao holds. Hence (1o) and (3o) are satisfied. (2o)
is satisfied by Proposition 4.
For each cwff Aı, if H ⊢ Aı ↓, let
V(Aı) = {Bı | Bı is a cwff ı and H ⊢ Aı = Bı},
and otherwise let V(Aı) be undefined. Also, let
Dı = {V(Aı) | Aı is a cwff ı and H ⊢ Aı ↓}.
(1ı), (2ı), and (3ı) are clearly satisfied.
Now suppose that Dα and Dβ are defined and that the conditions hold
for α and β. For each cwff Aαβ , if H ⊢ Aαβ ↓, let V(Aαβ) be the (partial
or total) function from Dβ to Dα whose value, for any argument V(Bβ) ∈
Dβ , is V(AαβBβ) if V(AαβBβ) is defined and is undefined if V(AαβBβ)
is undefined, and otherwise let V(Aαβ) be undefined. We must show that
this definition is independent of the particular cwff Bβ used to represent
the argument. So suppose V(Bβ) = V(Cβ); then H ⊢ Bβ = Cβ by (3β), so
H ⊢ AαβBβ ≃ AαβCβ by Lemmas 6 and 7 and R1′, and so V(AαβBβ) ≃
V(AαβCβ) by (2α) and (3α), Finally, let
Dαβ = {V(Aαβ) | Aαβ is a cwffαβ and H ⊢ Aαβ ↓}.
(1αβ) and (2αβ) are clearly satisfied; we must show that (3αβ) is satisfied.
Suppose V(Aαβ) = V(Bαβ). Then H ⊢ Aαβ ↓ and H ⊢ Bαβ ↓. Since H is
extensionally complete, there is a Cβ such that H ⊢ Cβ ↓ and
H ⊢ [Aαβ ↓ ∧Bαβ ↓ ∧ [AαβCβ ≃ BαβCβ ]] ⊃ [Aαβ = Bαβ ].
Then V(AαβCβ) ≃ V(Aαβ)(V(Cβ)) ≃ V(Bαβ)(V(Cβ)) ≃ V(BαβCβ), so
H ⊢ AαβCβ ≃ BαβCβ by (2α) and (3α), and soH ⊢ Aαβ = Bαβ . Now sup-
pose H ⊢ Aαβ = Bαβ . Then, for all cwffs Cβ ∈ Dβ , H ⊢ AαβCβ ≃ BαβCβ
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by Lemmas 6 and 7 and R1′, and so V(Aαβ)(V(Cβ)) ≃ V(AαβCβ) ≃
V(BαβCβ) ≃ V(Bαβ)(V(Cβ)). Hence V(Aαβ) = V(Bαβ).
We claim that M = 〈{Dα | α ∈ T },V〉 is an interpretation. For each
primitive constant cγ of Qu0 , H ⊢ cγ by A6, and thus V maps each primitive
constant of Qu0 of type γ into Dγ by (1
γ) and (2γ).
We must show that V(Qoαα) is the identity relation on Dα. Let
V(Aα) and V(Bα) be arbitrary members of Dα. Then V(Aα) = V(Bα)
iff H ⊢ Aα = Bα iff H ⊢ QoααAαBα iff T = V(QoααAαBα) =
V(Qoαα)(V(Aα))(V(Bα)). Thus V(Qoαα) is the identity relation on Dα.
We must show that, for α 6= o, V(ια(oα)) is the unique member selector on
Dα. For α 6= o, let Aoα be an arbitrary member of Doα, Bα be an arbitrary
member of Dα, and xα be a variable that does not occur in Aoα. Using A12
and A13, V(Aoα) = V(QoααBα) iffH ⊢ Aoα = QoααBα iffH ⊢ ια(oα)Aoα =
Bα iff V(ια(oα)Aoα) = V(Bα) iff V(ια(oα))(V(Aoα)) = V(Bα). Similarly,
using A12 and A13, V(∼∃1xα[Aoαxα]) = T iff H ⊢ ∼∃1xα[Aoαxα] iff H ⊢
ια(oα)Aoα ↑ iff V(ια(oα)Aoα) is undefined iff V(ια(oα))(V(Aoα)) is undefined.
Thus V(ια(oα)) is the unique member selector on Dα.
ThusM is an interpretation. We claim further thatM is a general model
for Qu0 . For each assignment ϕ into M and wff Cγ , let
Cϕγ = S
x
1
δ1
···x
n
δn
E1
δ1
···En
δn
Cγ
where x1δ1 · · ·x
n
δn
are the free variables of Cγ and E
i
δi
is the first cwff (in
some fixed enumeration) of Qu0 such that ϕ(x
i
δi
) = V(Eiδi) for all i with
1 ≤ i ≤ n.6 Let Vϕ(Cγ) ≃ V(C
ϕ
γ ). C
ϕ
γ is clearly a cwffγ , so Vϕ(Cγ) ∈ Dγ
if Vϕ(Cγ) is defined.
(a) Let Cγ be a variable xδ. Choose Eδ so that ϕ(xδ) = V(Eδ) as above.
Then Vϕ(Cγ) = Vϕ(xδ) = V(x
ϕ
δ ) = V(Eδ) = ϕ(xδ).
(b) Let Cγ be a primitive constant. Then Vϕ(Cγ) = V(C
ϕ
γ ) = V(Cγ).
(c) Let Cγ be [AαβBβ]. If Vϕ(Aαβ) is defined, Vϕ(Bβ) is defined,
and Vϕ(Aαβ) is defined at Vϕ(Bβ), then Vϕ(Cγ) = Vϕ(AαβBβ) =
V(AϕαβB
ϕ
β) = V(A
ϕ
αβ)(V(B
ϕ
β )) = Vϕ(Aαβ)(Vϕ(Bβ)). Now assume
Vϕ(Aαβ) is undefined, Vϕ(Bβ) is undefined, or Vϕ(Aαβ) is not de-
fined at Vϕ(Bβ). Then H ⊢ A
ϕ
αβ ↑, H ⊢ B
ϕ
β ↑, or V(A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β ) is un-
defined. If α = o, then H ⊢ Aϕαβ ↑ or H ⊢ B
ϕ
β ↑, which implies
H ⊢ ∼AϕαβB
ϕ
β by A9, so H ⊢ A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β = Fo, so V(A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β ) = V(Fo),
6S
x
1
δ1
···x
n
δn
E1
δ1
···En
δn
Cγ is the result of simultaneously substituting Eiδi for each free occurrence
of xiδi
in Cγ for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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so Vϕ(AαβBβ) = V(Fo), and so Vϕ(Cγ) = F. If α 6= o and H ⊢ A
ϕ
αβ ↑
or H ⊢ Bϕβ ↑, then H ⊢ [A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β ]↑ by A10, and so V(A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β ) is un-
defined. Hence, if α 6= o, Vϕ(Cγ) ≃ Vϕ(AαβBβ) ≃ V(A
ϕ
αβB
ϕ
β ) is
undefined.
(d) Let Cγ be [λxαBβ ]. Let V(Eα) be an arbitrary member of Dα, and
so Eα is a cwff and H ⊢ Eα ↓. Given an assignment ϕ, let ψ = (ϕ :
xα/V(Eα). From A4 it follows that H ⊢ [λxαBβ ]
ϕEα ≃ B
ψ
β . Then
Vϕ(Cγ)(V(Eα)) ≃ V([λxαBβ ]ϕ)(V(Eα)) ≃ V(B
ψ
β ) ≃ Vψ(Bβ). Thus
Vϕ(Cγ) satisfies condition (d) in the definition of a general model.
Thus M is a general model for Qu0 (and hence for Q
u
0). Also, if Ao ∈ G,
then Ao ∈ H, so H ⊢ Ao, so V(Ao) = T and M |= Ao, so M is a general
model for G. Clearly, (1) card(Dα) ≤ card(L(Q
u
0)) since V maps a subset of
the cwffsα of Qu0 onto Dα and (2) card(L(Q
u
0)) = card(L(Q
u
0)), and so M
is frugal. 
THEOREM 22 (Henkin’s Completeness Theorem for Qu0). Let H be a set
of sentences of Qu0 . If H |= Ao, then H ⊢ Ao.
Proof. Assume H |= Ao, and let Bo be the universal closure of Ao. Then
H |= Bo. Suppose H ∪ {∼Bo} is consistent. Then, by Henkin’s Theorem,
there is a general model M for H ∪ {∼Bo}, and so M |= ∼Bo. Since M
is also a general model for H, M |= Bo. From this contradiction it follows
that H ∪ {∼Bo} is inconsistent. Hence H ⊢ Bo by the Deduction Theorem
and the Tautology Theorem. Therefore, H ⊢ Ao by Universal Instantiation
and A5. 
8 Conclusion
Qu0 is a version of Church’s type theory that directly formalizes the tra-
ditional approach to undefinedness. In this paper we have presented the
syntax, semantics, and proof system of Qu0 . The semantics is based on
Henkin-style general models. We have also proved that Qu0 is sound and
complete with respect to its semantics.
Qu0 is a modification of Q0. Its syntax is essentially identical to the
syntax of Q0. Its semantics is based on general models that include partial
functions as well as total functions and in which terms may be nondenoting.
Its proof system is derived from the proof system of Q0; the axiom schemas
and rules of inference of Q0 have been modified to accommodate partial
functions and undefined terms and to axiomatize definite description.
Our presentation of Qu0 is intended to show as clearly as possible what
must be changed in Church’s type theory in order to formalize the tradi-
tional approach to undefinedness. Our development of Qu0 closely follows
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Andrews’ development of Q0. Notes indicate where and how Q0 and Qu0
differ from each other. And the proofs of the soundness and completeness
theorems for Qu0 follow very closely the proofs of these theorems for Q0.
Q0 and Qu0 have the same theoretical expressivity (see Note 6). How-
ever, with its formalization of the traditional approach, Qu0 has significantly
greater practical expressivity than Q0. Statements involving partial func-
tions and undefined terms can be expressed in Qu0 more naturally and con-
cisely than in Q0 (see [9]). All the standard laws of predicate logic hold in
Qu0 except those involving equality and substitution, but these do hold for
defined terms. In summary, Qu0 has the benefit of greater practical expres-
sivity at the cost of a modest departure from standard predicate logic.
The benefits of a practical logic like Qu0 would be best realized by a
computer implementation of the logic. Qu0 has not been implemented, but
the related logic lutins [6, 7, 8] has been implemented in the imps theorem
proving system [10, 11] and successfully used to prove hundreds of theorems
in traditional mathematics, especially in mathematical analysis. lutins
is essentially just a more sophisticated version of Qu0 with subtypes and
additional expression constructors. An implemented logic that formalizes
the traditional approach to undefinedness can reap the benefits of a proven
approach developed in mathematical practice over hundreds of years.
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